Showing posts with label virtual law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label virtual law. Show all posts

Bitcoin Foundation Reacts To FinCEN Guidance

By Patrick Murck
Bitcoin Foundation
Tuesday, March 19, 2013

https://bitcoinfoundation.org/blog/?p=152

FinCEN shook us all from our Monday afternoon stupor by dropping some provocative “guidance” for those involved in the business and use of digital currencies and, in particular those of us involved with the grand experiment that is Bitcoin.

You can and should read what FinCEN had to say for yourself here.

Upon an initial reading two things struck me:
  1. FinCEN firmly believes that virtual currency in general, and bitcoin in particular, does not fall under the prepaid access rules.
  2. FinCEN seems intent on recreating and expanding the prepaid access rules for virtual currency and bitcoin under the mantle of money transmission.
I was happy to see FinCEN issue some clarity around the overly-broad prepaid access rules and definitively state that they do not apply in the context of bitcoin. This is quite interesting because in my conversations with seasoned payments and digital currency lawyers, prepaid access seemed to be the most likely trigger for FinCEN regulation – closely followed, of course, by money transmission.

That’s about where my happiness ended as the clear guidance quickly devolved into something a little less comprehensible.

In particular, I’m a little disheartened that FinCEN appears to be creating an entirely new regulatory scheme under the guise of “guidance.” Of course, FinCEN cannot rely on this guidance in any enforcement action, as they must readily acknowledge. Simply put, under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), FinCEN can’t promulgate new rules without going through a notice and comment proceeding whereby the public may have their voices heard. If FinCEN would like to expand its statutory authority over “money transmitters” to include brand new categories such as “administrators” and “exchangers” of digital currency it must do so through proper rule making proceedings and not by fiat. I welcome that conversation.

State Money Transmitter Issues

It should also be noted at the outset, in case there is any confusion, that FinCEN’s rule-making and interpretations have no practical effect on State money transmitter laws (although FinCEN or Congress may preempt such State laws in the future). State MTB laws and enforcement is something that should be discussed, and to some degree worried about, but it’s a separate issue.

FinCEN Overreaches

Read closely FinCEN’s guidance implies that every person who has ever had any virtual currency and has ever exchanged that virtual currency for real currency may now be considered a money transmitter under the Bank Secrecy Act. That is, of course, an untenable position.

FinCEN starts going off the tracks early on, as they carefully define a “User” (not subject to MSB registration) as “a person that obtains virtual currency to purchase goods or services” as opposed to an “Exchanger” who is “a person engaged as a business in the exchange of virtual currency for real currency, funds, or other virtual currency.” Left unsaid are any specifics around the facts and circumstances that would constitute “engaging as a business.”

What is crystal-clear is that once a person sells a single Satoshi for real currency that person is no longer a “User” and therefore not categorically exempted from MSB registration.

Later in the document as FinCEN turns its attention to discussing decentralized virtual currencies we get the money paragraph.

In a bizarre shot across the bow at miners, FinCEN states unequivocally that “a person that creates units of convertible virtual currency and sells those units to another person for real currency or its equivalent is engaged in transmission to another location and is a money transmitter.”

And then, for good measure, FinCEN completely muddies the waters by stating: “In addition, a person is an exchanger and a money transmitter if the person accepts such decentralized convertible virtual currency from one person and transmits it to another person as part of the acceptance and transfer of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency.”

FinCEN’s position as it relates to bitcoin can be summed up as follows:
  1. A person may spend money to purchase bitcoin or mine bitcoin and then exchange the currency for goods and/or services without having to register with FinCEN as an MSB.
  2. If a person receives real money in exchange for their bitcoin they MAY have to register with FinCEN.
  3. If a miner exchanges their mined bitcoin for real money they MUST register with FinCEN.
  4. Anyone transacting bitcoin on someone else’s behalf MUST register with FinCEN.
This framework would wildly expand the reach of FinCEN and the BSA, and would be infeasible for many, if not most, members of the bitcoin community to comply with. An individual or micro-business cannot be expected to create a robust AML/KYC program anytime they sell 1 or 100 bitcoin on an exchange or in-person. The BSA was never intended to apply this broadly and reach this far into people’s everyday lives. Perhaps a little more guidance is needed.

Patrick Murck is general counsel at the Bitcoin Foundation. Reprinted with permission.

For further reading:
"The War On Bitcoin—and Anonymity", Eli Dourado, March 20, 2013
"FinCEN sounds death knell for US based Bitcoin businesses", Irdial, March 19, 2013

Bitcoin: Financial Deepening and Currency Internationalization

By JP Koning
Moneyness
Thursday, February 21, 2013

http://jpkoning.blogspot.com/2013/02/financial-deepening-and-currency.html

Much of the conversation about bitcoin adoption focuses on its use in goods and services transactions. Breaking bitcoin news, for instance, draws attention to the fact that the Internet Archive will be giving employees the option to be paid in bitcoin. This focus on brick & mortar transactions means that the role that bitcoin financial instruments—stocks, bonds, and derivatives—have to play in promoting bitcoin adoption often gets overshadowed.

I'm currently reading Barry Eichengreen's Exorbitant Privilege which goes into the mechanics of what it takes to create a truly international currency. Eichengreen points out that prior to World War I the dollar played a negligible role relative to the pound sterling in world markets, but by the mid 1920s it was the dominant unit for invoicing payments and denominating bonds. Eichengreen's theory is that the US dollar became the world's go-to currency because of the emergence of a very specific financial instrument—the banker's acceptance.

An acceptance is much like a bill of exchange, a financial instrument I explained in my last post. Say a merchant decides to pay for a shipment of goods with a personal IOU, or bill. If a bank first "accepts" the bill i.e. if it agrees to vouch for the IOU, then this gives the bill more credibility. It is now a banker's acceptance.

According to Eichengreen, around 1908 or 1909, a concerted effort to foster the growth of the US acceptance market began. Up till then, US banks had been prohibited from dealing in acceptances and branching abroad—both these limitations would be removed by new legislation. To promote liquidity and backstop the acceptance market, the Federal Reserve, established in 1914, was given authority to buy and sell acceptances via open market operations. Furthermore, these acceptances could legally "back", or collateralize, the Fed's note issue. This feature was particularly helpful. Although the Fed was also legally permitted to purchase government securities, government securities could not "back" the note issue. Acceptances, therefore, became the more flexible and preferred asset for Fed open market operations, at least until 1932 when the limitations on government collateral were removed. According to Eichengreen, the Fed was the largest investor in the acceptance market and sometimes held the majority of outstanding issues on its balance sheet.

By the mid-1920s foreign acceptances denominated in dollars exceeded those denominated in sterling by a factor of 2:1 and more central banks held US forex reserves than sterling. London was on the way out, and New York on the way in. By 1929, the amount of outstanding foreign public bonds denominated in dollars (excluding the Commonwealth) exceeded sterling bonds. The lesson here is that a key step in the sequence of internationalizing a currency is getting it to be used in financial markets. This involves the development of deep, liquid, and accessible markets in securities denominated in that currency.

What sort of financial deepening do we see in the bitcoin universe, and how might we compare it to the dollar's emergence in the 1910s and 20s?

There are a number of healthy signs of financial deepening. I count five competing bitcoin securities exchanges that provide a forum for trading bitcoin-denominated stocks and bonds. These include Cryptostocks, BTCT, MPEx, Havelock, and Picostocks. A sixth, LTC-Global, provides a market in litecoin securities, a competing altchain. Holders of bitcoin needn't cash out of the bitcoin universe in order to get a better return. Instead, they can buy a bond or a stock listed on any of these exchanges.

The largest publicly-traded company in the bitcoin universe is SatoshiDice, a bitcoin gambling website listed on MPEx. With 100 million shares outstanding and a price of 0.006 BTC, SatoshiDice's market cap is ~600,000 BTC which comes out to around $17 million. SatoshiDice IPOed last year at 0.0032 BTC. With bitcoin only trading at $12 back then (it is now worth $29), the entire company would have been worth $4 million. Given today's $17 million valuation, SatoshiDice shareholders have seen a nice return over a short amount of time—much of it provided by bitcoin appreciation.

While SatoshiDice certainly provides some depth to bitcoin financial markets it has the potential to shallow them out too. Because MPEx charges large fees to trade on its exchange, a few of the competing exchanges have created what are called SatoshiDice "passthroughs". Much like an ETF, a passthrough holds an underlying asset—in this case SatoshiDice shares on MPEx—and flows through all dividends earned to passthrough owners. As a result, investors can get exposure to SatoshiDice without having to pay MPEx's expensive fees. BTCT, for instance, lists two different SatoshiDice passthroughs (GSDPT and S.DICE-PT) which together account for more trading volume than all other stocks and bonds listed on BTCT.

SatoshiDice's sheer size is to some extent problematic since Bitcoin financial markets are not as deep as they might appear. Should something ever happen to SatoshiDice, a big part of the bitcoin financial universe's liquidity will be wiped out, and this would ripple out across the entire field of bitcoin securities. The same might have happened to banker's acceptances in their day, except for one difference—the Fed was willing to back the acceptance market up. In the bitcoin universe, there's no buyer of of last resort to provide liquidity support to SatoshiDice shareholders.

Another impediment to deeper bitcoin markets is the hazy legality of the bitcoin securities exchanges. The first major bitcoin securities exchange, GLBSE, was closed in October 2012 with no prior warning. According to this article, potential regulatory and tax liabilities convinced GLBSE's founder to shut it down on his own behest. If any of the existing bitcoin exchanges were to grow too noticeable, one could imagine the SEC (or its equivalent) knocking on their door and forcing the exchange-owner to pull the plug. This sort of regulatory uncertainty can only dampen the liquidity and depth of bitcoin financial markets.

US authorities, on the other hand, didn't need to heed the rules when they built the banker's acceptance market. They created the rules. If financial deepening in the Bitcoin universe is to proceed it will happen despite regulations and not because of them.

The last headwind to bitcoin financial deepening is bitcoin's volatility. Eichengreen writes that the seesawing of the pound sterling during the war period encouraged financial markets to search for a more stable unit in which to express debts. The pound had always been anchored to gold (or silver), but it was unpegged from its century's long gold tether when the war broke out. Although it was repegged in January 1916, this time to the dollar, this did not secure confidence in the sterling's value since the peg was dependent on American support. When this support was withdrawn at war's end, sterling fell by a third within a year. Through all of this, the dollar continued to be defined in terms of gold, a feature which no doubt attracted issuers.

Bitcoin, on the other hand, has more than doubled in just two months. Back in June 2011, it fell by 50% in just two days. Like pound sterling during the war, bitcoin's lack of stability will do little to promote deeper financial markets.

Although I've stressed the difficulties that bitcoin markets face in developing more depth, the sheer amount of financial innovation I'm seeing from those involved in the various bitcoin securities exchanges is impressive. I wish them the best. The more they build up bitcoin securities markets, the better an alternative bitcoin presents to competing currency units.

[Disclaimer: I am long SatoshiDice and several bitcoin mining stocks.]

Reprinted with permission. 
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